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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As cultures have changed and become more complex, 
there have been encountered countless conflicts between 
personal responsibilities and the responsibilities of the 
society in which people live. These conflicts have resulted 
in various formal procedures and rules that have attempted 
to govern behavior in order that society may live with an 
individual and an individual may live within a society. 
Under the American legal system all persons have the 
right to be free from intentional or careless bodily injury. 
A principle of law states that every individual is personally 
liable in damages for his acts of negligence. 1 
School accidents are, unfortunately, likely to occur 
despite the utmost care taken by authorities to protect 
pupils and accidents do take place anywhere on the school 
premises. 
Physical education teachers should realize that they 
cannot be too cautious in preventing injuries to pupils, as 
they might have to defend themselves against negligence 
charges if accidents occur. Physical education teachers need 
an understanding of the legal principles on which negligence 
' 3 8  &. - Jr., Negligence Sec. 4. 
2 
rests so that they can justify their behavior and defend 
themselves. 
Iowa law requires the attendance of childrea at 
1 
school. If a school child is injured, who is responsible 
under the law? Ia the school district or the teacher, 
assuming there has been regligence on the part of one or both 
parties, held liable for an iajury? Is the two hundred year 
old doctrine of governmental immmity a shield for either 
involved party? 
A complex and changing culture dictates the necessity 
for knowledge of the cornmom law a d  statutory law in Iowa and 
their applicatiora to the field of physical education. Aware- 
ness of the nature of legal liability in the area of negligence 
is vital to the physical educator's defense. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Statement of the problem. Professional duties of 
physical educators a d  legal sanctions have created circum- 
stances requiring the awareness of the responsibilities of 
phyaical education teachers in Iowa to their students. It 
was the purpose of this study to alert those individuals who 
are intrusted with the safety of students participating in 
physical education programs, to their legal duties and to 
aid in evaluating teaching practices and curriculum in light 
- 
1 
Iowa Code Sec. 299.1, 1953. 
--9 
3 
of the immaturity of the student and the importance of the 
teacher's trust. 
Importance of the study. The consequences of legal 
liability arising out of injury to a student may seriously 
involve and affect not only the physical education teacher 
in Iowa, but also the physical education curriculum. Injuries 
resulting from physical education programs have been a source 
of a great number of suits for damages against physical educa- 
tion teachers. 1 
A judgment for money damages against a physical 
education teacher is a real and apparent problem. It behooves 
each concerned person to be conscious not only of his exposure 
to financial loss, but also of whatever moral obligations he 
may feel. Iowa school districts presently enjoy the benefit 
of governmental immunity from liability for negligence. 
2 
Philosophical differences exist concerning the wisdom of 
school district immunity as a facet of governmental immunity 
and each exposure to scrutiny by a court creates the 
possibility of abolition or erosion of the present protection 
of immunity for negligence. Curriculum content and pattern 
may suffer as the result of a decision by a court or 
'~ational Education Association Research Division, 
Who is Liable for Pupil Injuries (washington, D.C. : National 
-- -
Commission on Safety Education, 1 9 6 3 ) ,  p. 48. 
2 
Howard C. Leibee, Tort 
Pupils ( ~ i c h i ~ a n :  Campus 
4 
legislative action prompted by an incident of injury to a 
student. The law's emphasis generally is on liability for 
wrongdoing. Recognition of responsibility to avoid the 
consequences of liability requires constant vigilance and 
continuing appraisal sf teaching situations by the physical 
educator and school authorities. 
11. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Action. Action is the ordinary proceeding in a court 
of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the 
enforcement or protection of a right; the redress or prevention 
of a wrsng; a legal proceeding by a party complainant against 
a party defendant to obtain the judgment of the court in 
relation to some remedy claimed to given by law to the party 
complaining. 1 
Assumption of risk. Assumption of risk is the fact 
of comprehension that a peril is to be encountered and a 
willingness to encounter it; a positive exercise of a 
2 
volition in the form of an assent to the risk. This 
doctrine must not be confused with contributory negligence. 
The latter is based on carelessness while the former is 
intelligent choice. 
' ~ e n r ~  C. Black, Blackf s (st. Paul: 
West Publishing company ,193j), PP. 
245 Corpus Juris, 841 Sec. 255.  
5 
Comrnon law. Common law is the body of those 
principle8 and rules of action which arose out of custom and 
usage and judgments of courts recognizing such customs and 
1 
usages. It ia the body of law created by prior decisions. 
The common law is distinguished from statutory law, or laws 
created by legislature. 
Contributory negligence. The want or lack of ordinary 
care by the injured person, concurring with the negligence of 
another, and thus contributing to the injury is contributory 
L 
negligence. Contributory fault may bar an individual from a 
recovery if his misconduct combines and concurs with 
negligence in causing the injury. 
Damages. Damages is the pecuniary compensation re- 
covered in the courts for the darnage suffered by a person 
through amother's wrongful act. 3 
Defendant. The defendant is the party against whom 
a recovery is sought in an action or suit. 
4 
Governmental functions. Governmental functions are 
purposes pertaining to the administration of general laws 
made to enforce the general policy of the state, such as the 
'glpck, 9. g.,  p .  368. 
2 
Restatement - -  of the Law of Torts Sec. 486 (1965). 
3~lack, 9. g., p. 499. 
4 
Ibid., p. 541. 
-
6 
establishment of a school district, a police or fire depart- 
7 men*, or for the removal of garbage. Acts done in execution 
of police powers are performance of services for the benefit 
of the public and therefore governmental. 2 nGovenvaental 
functionn is to be distinguished from a "proprietary functionn. 
The latter may be an act performed by a governmental sub- 
division, but by reason of the nature of the act or service 
would be considered a non-governmental function. 3 
Guest statute. A guest statute is a legislative 
enactment which limits the right of a "guestn to hold liable 
the driver of a vehicle in which he is conveyed gratuitously. 
The law of the jurisdiction prescribes the degree of 
negligence which is excused. If a driver is grossly negligent 
or reckless he may then be responsible for an injury caused 
to a guest. 
4 
Liability. Liability is legal responsibility; the 
state of being bound in law and justice to do something which 
may be enforced by a court. 5 
7 ~ o w l e y  v. Cedar Rapids, 203 Iowa 7245, 212 N.W. 158 
(1927) 
'~srdis v. Cit g Moines, 240 Iowa 105, 113, 
34 N.W. 2-(194+ 
3~owlev v. cedar Rapids, 203 Iowa 1245, 212 N.W. 158 
(1927) 
4 
Iowa code Sec. 327.494 (1965) 
--9 
7 
Malfeasance. Malfeasance is the wrongful or unjust 
doing of some act which the doer has no right to perform. 
~ v i l  doing, or ill conduct. 1 
Misfeasance. Misfeasance is the failure to do a 
lawful act in a proper manner; omitting to do it as it should 
be done. 2 
Ne~ligence. Negligence is the failure to exercise 
the degree of care demanded by the circumstances; or as the 
want of that care which the law prescribes under the 
particular circumstances existing at the time of the act or 
omission which is involved. 3 
Nonfeasance. Nonfeasance is the neglect or failure 
of a person ts do same act which he ought to do; the omission 
or failure to perform a required duty, or total neglect of 
duty. 4 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff is one who brings an action; 
the party who complains or sues in a personal action. 
5 
L 
Ibid., p. 1193. 
338 &. Jllr., Negligence Scc. 2. 
4 
Black, OJ. G., p. 1255. 
51bid., p. 1364. 
Proprietary function. Proprietary function is an 
act which could as well be performed by private persons or 
corporation rather than a governmental subdivision. A 
municipal electrical plan selling electricity is an example 
of a proprietary function. 1 
Proximate cause. In a legal sense, proximate cause 
is the natural and continuous sequence of events, unbroken 
by an intervening cause, which produces injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. The legal term 
which limits and describes causes which are justified in 
holding one creating a chain of events responsible for the 
results. 2 
Quasi-public corporation. Quasi-public corporations 
are public bodies and subdivisions established by statute to 
perform specifically delegated functions of government.3 The 
category of quasi-corporations includes school districts. 
4 
Recklessness. Recklessness is conduct more than 
negligence, manifesting a heedless disregard for or 
'niller v. Town of Milford, 224 Iowa 753, 276 N.Y. 
826 ( 1 9 3 F  
'~henoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 99 N.W. 2d, 310 
(1 959) . 
3~arson v. School District, 223 Iowa 691, 
2 72 N. w ..-632(1937 
4 School District, 230 Iowa 771, 
298 N.W. 85 (1941 
9 
indifference to the consequences or the rights or safety of 
others. 1 
Respondeat superior. "Let the master a n ~ w e r . ~  
Respondeat superior is the legal doctrine of holding the 
master or employer liable for the wrongful act of his servant 
or employee. 2 
Save harmless statute. A save harmless statute is 
a law enacted requiring school districts to indemnify teachers 
or pay judgments rendered against them arising out of negli- 
gence involving school duties. 3 
Tort. The term tort is used to denote a wrong or 
wrongful act for which an action will lie; a legal wrong 
committed upon the person or property independent of con- 
tract; an unlawful violation of another's legal rights. 4 
111. THE PROCEDURE 
In the preparation of this study, textbooks pertaining 
to school law were read and examined. The information obtained 
from these books was recorded according to outlined headings 
1 
Neyens v. Gehl, 235 Iowa 115, 15 N.W. 2d 888 (1944). 
2~1ack, z. it., p. 1546. 
3~ational Education Association Research Division, 
z- G., p. 23. 
4 Black, z. g., p. 1738. 
10 
in the areas of school law and phyaical education in Iowa. 
Legal materials were obtained from The National @- 
-
porter System, West's a Number Digests, American Juris- 
prudence, Black's - Law Dictionary, and The Iowa Code and 
---9 
were analyzed and selected for their applicatory usefulness 
to each selected area of the problem. Professional physical 
education and education pamphlets, periodicals, and law 
reviews were also consulted as possible source materials. 
The information in these sources was selected for its 
relevancy to the subject of legal liability in physical 
education in Iowa. 
IV. NEGLIGENCE AS A TORT 
Negligence in the popular sense is the lack of due 
1 
diligence or care. Actionable negligence, or negligence 
in the legal sense, has been defined as a violation of the 
duty to use due care. However, one not infrequently 
encounters the statement that no comprehensive definition 
2 is possible. More particularly, actionable negligence is 
the failure of one owing a duty to another to do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done 
under the circumstances, or doing what such a person would 
 horndi dike, Barnhart, Dictionary 
( ~ e w  York: Doubleday and Company 
'~c~onald v. Chica o & N.K. R. Compmy, 26 Iowa 124, 
96 Am. ~ e F 7 T Z 7 1 8 6 8 -  
7 1 
not have done, which omission or commission is the proximate 
1 cause of injury to the other. The elements of duty, breach, 
proximate cause, and injury are essentials of actionable 
negligence. In the absence of any one of them, the plaintiff 
has no cause or action for negligence which would permit him 
to prevail. 
The basic problem in tort law is to ascertain what 
kinds of conduct the law has come to regard as the basis for 
legal liability, and then the harms for which one is liable. 
To be determined is what conduct is tortious and to discover 
for what consequences of a harmful nature a person is 
responsible. We may regard the law as imposing a duty upon 
one to avoid or refrain from conduct which subjects others 
to risks of certain consequences. This duty concept gives 
rise to two forms of conduct which may be characterized as 
negligence: 
1 .  Acts which a prudent person should realize involve 
unreasonable risk of injury to others. 
2. Failure to do an act which is necessary to protect 
another and which one is under a legal duty to 
do.2 
The creation of an unreasonable risk to others, that 
is active negligence or misfeasance, may occur in a number 
of ways. An act may be negligent because it is not properly 
v. Chicago - B&Q R. e., 204 Iowa 7385, 273 N.W. 
12 
done, or it may be negligent, although dene with due care, 
because of the circumstances under which it is done. Conduct 
may be negligent because one is indulging in acts which in- 
volve unreasonable risk of direct harm, or because one 
creates a situation unreasonably dangerous to others because 
of the likelihood of the action of third persons or of 
inanimate objects. Entrustment of dangerous devices to 
incompetent persons is another form of negligent conduct. 1 
Failure to make adequate preparation to avoid harm to others 
before engaging in certain conduct and failure to employ due 
care to give adequate warning may all constitute conduct 
creating a risk of harm. 2 
Additionally, an affirmative duty may be imposed upon 
persons who are in no manner creating risks by their 
activities. This duty is not general but is confined to 
persons occupying relationships to others, such as a teacher- 
pupil situation. Nsn-feasance is the legal term describing 
the failure to take positive action to protect others from 
harm not created by a wrongful act of the defendant. There 
is, in general, no duty to aid others. There is a duty to 
take positive action to avoid unreasonable risks to others 
not created by the actor if the person charged with such 
duty is enjoying benefits from the relationship. Relationships 
' ~ c ~ l d o n  v. Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 116 N.W. 147 (1908). 
238 - Am. - Jur., Negligence S e c .  14. 
giving rise to the duty to take positive precautions may 
include a contract and/or control over the conduct of a 
person. 7 
Fundamentally, the duty of a person to use care and 
his liability for negligence depends upon the tendency of 
his acts under the circumstances as they are known or should 
be known to him. On the other hand, an injury is not action- 
able if it was not foreseen, or could not have been foreseen 
2 
or reasonably anticipated. The duty to use due care is not 
limited to a situation where the balance of probabilities is 
on the side of danger. If there is some probability of harm 
sufficiently serious that ordinary men would take precautions 
to avoid it, then failure to do so is negligence. To render 
one liable for negligance, it is sufficient that he should 
have foreseen that the negligence would probably result in 
injury of some kind to some person, and he need not have 
foreseen the particular consequences of injury that resulted. 3 
A legal creature, the reasonably prudent person placed 
in a similar set of circumstances, is the measure used by the 
jury or judge to determine if the defendant's actions 
constituted a breach of duty. 
138 &. Jur., Negligence Sec. 19, 20, 21. 
2 ~ h  ssen v Daven ort Ice and Cold Storage Company, 
134 Iowa-12 *N+clml~ - 
K.C.R. E., 77 Iowa 607, 
42 N.W. 555 
The standard of conduct whether left to the jury 
or laid down by the court, is an external stpndard, 
and take no account of the personal equation of the 
man concerned. The notion that it should be co- 
extensive with the judgment of each individual was 
exploded, if it needed exploding by Chief Justice 
Tindal in Vaughan v. Men1 ove . I  
The defendant is held to an external standard of the 
reasonable man although he may be in fact incapable of such 
conduct. No allowance is made for varieties of temperament, 
intellect, and education. One is ignorant in any field at 
his peril. A special field of skill, however, may modify 
the standard of the ordinary reasonable person. For 
example, a physical education instructor may be held to 
possess special knowledge and skill and the care he must 
exercise is that of the ordinary, reasonable, physical 
2 
education instructor. 
The individual to whom a duty may be owed may affect 
the standard of care to be exercised by the defendant. 
Persona who are known to be deficient in mind or body, or 
who are young and inexperienced, are entitled to a degree 
of care proportioned to their incapacity to protect 
themselves. 3 
It can be seen that the ordinary, reasonable, and 
prudent man, adopted as a standard by the law, must in 
' 1 ~ 6  g. - S. 589,  48 L. ed. 610. 
2 38 e. - Jur.,Negligence Sec. 31. 
3 ~ 1 3  v. Chicago g .  & Q. g. a., 134 Iowa 6 9 0 ,  1 I2 
N. W. 171 1907) .  
15 
reality be an ideal man in the sense that his cenduct is in 
every case the gauge sf due care under the circumstances. 
The question whether a defendant ia guilty of action- 
able negligence is ordinarily one of fact far the jury, it 
being left to them to determine under proper instructions 
from the court whether or not the defendant acted with 
reasonable care under the circumstances of the case. Under 
proper instruction, the jury in their deliberations would 
have established as a part of the finding of negligence that 
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and breached that 
duty. The court may be bound to make a finding for the 
defendant, if the evidence is so clear that reasonable minds 
could not differ and there is insufficient evidence of 
negligence conduct on the part of the defendant. 1 
Proximate cause or legal cause is the third element 
necessary to establish negligence. Legal causation must be 
found to relate the duty and the breach of the duty to the 
injury caused. Proximate cause has been defined by the Iowa 
Supreme Court as, "any cause which in natural and continous 
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces the result complained of and without which the 
2 
result would not have occurred. " 
It is not necessary to a defendant's liability that 
'~ohnston v. Johnson, 225 Iowa 77, 279 N o  d .  139 (1938). 
2 Chenoweth v. F l y ,  291 Iowa 1 1 ,  1 6 ,  99 N. W .  2d 310 
(1 959) 
16 
the consequences of his negligence should have been foreseen, 
and it ia sufficient if the injuries are the natural, though 
not necessary or inevitable, result of the wrong. ' The 
purpose of testing proximate cause according to the natural 
and probable result is to apply the common experience of 
milnkind to the situation and to preclude liability for a 
consequence of negligence which does not follow naturally 
and reasonably from the negligence. An injury may be deemed 
the natural and probable result of a negligent act if after 
the event, and in retrospect to the-act, the injury seems to 
be the reasonable rather than the extraordinary consequence 
of the wrong. 
Assuming negligence, additional causes may affect 
onef s responsibility for an injury. The mere concurrence of 
one's negligence with the proximate and efficient cause of 
an injury will not impose liability upon him, but the fact 
that some other cause cancurred with the negligence of the 
defendant in producing an injury does not relieve the 
defendant from liability unless he can show that such other 
cause would have produced the injury independently of his 
2 
negligence. It must be remembered that the negligence of 
one person is in no sense justified by the concurring 
negligence of another. 
1 Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W. 2d 682 ( 1958 ) .  
2 Walrod 
(1  900) . 
Webster County, Iowa 81 N.W. 
17 
The injecti.cn of a new act of negligence by a third 
person may relieve the original wrongdoer of responsibility 
for his actions. Intervention of a new, independent, and 
efficient cause sever8 whatever cemection there may be 
between the original act, which is now remote, and the 
injury. The new act must meet the requirements of proximate 
cause to provide the legal insulation necessary to relieve 
the original act of negligence. 7 
Causation is not a completely defined set of legal 
principles but, rather, equities, public policy, and 
precedent as established by the courts. It is the limitation 
the courts have put upon the responsibility of a person for 
his cenduct. 2 
The fourth element necessary to establish negligence 
and the right to recover damages is injury or damage. 
Without proof of some damage to the interests of the plaintiff 
a negligence action is not complete. Physical injury to the 
plaintiffts person or tangible property provide a basis for 
a jury to establish the recovery of money damages. 3 
Any discussion of negligence requires recognition of 
the principal defenses to a negligence action. Defenses 
1 Gray v. - Des Moines, 221 Iowa 596,  265 N. W .  612 
(1936 ) .  
2~henoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 7 1 ,  16, 99 N.W. 2 d  310 
(1959) 
338 &I. -* Jur I Negligence Sec. 1 1 .  
18 
include a denial of negligence, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, unavoidable accident, and an act of God. 
A Person may have acted or failed to act without 
negligence and as a reasonably prudent person should have 
acted under the circumstances. The plaintiff has the legal 
I burden to prove the defendant Is negligence, and the defense 
may rely on a mere denial sf negligence or the defendant may 
assert positive evidence that due care was exercised to 
prevent or protect the plaintiff from harm. 
A defense of contributory negligence may be raised by 
the defendant to bar plaintifft s recovery. Reasonable self- 
protection is expected of all sane persons and the defendant 
may seek to avoid a finding of liability by proving that the 
plaintiff contributed to his injury by his own negligence. 
In Iowa, the finding of contributory negligence on the part 
Z 
of the plaintiff is a complete bar to his right of recovery. 
A recent statutory change of the Iowa statutes now places the 
burden ef pleading and prsving plaintiff's contributory 
negligence on the defendant . 3  If the defendant relys upon 
the negligence of the plaintiff as a complete defense or bar 
to the plaintiff's recovery, the defendant shall have the 
I Heacock v. Baul e , 216 Iowa 311, 249 N.W. 
2 
v. Chicago R.I. & P. E., 89 Iowa 74, 56 N.W. 
277 (7893 
3 ~ o w a  -- 9  Code Sec. 
19 
burden of pleading and proving negligence of the plaintiff, 
and that it was a proximate cause of the injury or damage. 1 
It should be remembered that minors are not held to 
the same degree of care for self-protection as are adults. 
The standard required of children is that degree of care 
which the great mass of children of like age, intelligence, 
and experience ordinarily would exercise under the same 
circumstances. A child may be too young to be charged with 
contributory negligence regardless of his age if he is of 
tender years. A four year old child, a passenger in colliding 
cars, was conclusively presumed incapable of being negligent 
by reason of his age and circumstances.2 An interpretation 
of Iowa law was rendered by the federal court in Hodges v. 
u . s . ~ ,  in which the court determined that a child under the 
age of seven was incapable of negligence. 
Between the ages of seven and fourteen a child is 
presumed incapable of exercising judgment so as to charge 
him with contributory negligence, but the presumption is 
4 
rebuttable by showing evidence of his capacity. As the 
presumption is stated, ordinarily at fourteen years of age, 
'~chulte v. Gosselink, --- , Iowa, --- , 148 N.W. 2d 434 
(1967) . 
2 Law v. Hemmingsen, 249 Iowa 820, 89 N.W.2d 386 ( 1958 ) .  
-
3~odges v .  - U . S . ,  98 F. S U P P ~ .  281 (s.D. Iowa, 1348). 
4 McEldon v. Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 116 N.W. 147 (1908). 
20 
an infant is presumed to have sufficient capacity and under- 
standing to be sensible of danger and having the power to 
avoid it. 1 
Assumption ef risk is a defense which may be raised 
by the defendant to exonerate himself of liability for 
negligence. Assumption of risk is a legal doctrine which 
presupposes that despite a relation or situation known to be 
dangerous, a person appreciating the danger involved, volun- 
tarily chooses to enter upon and remain within the area of 
2 danger. Cantributory negligence and assumption of risk 
are distinguishable. In Edwards v. Kirk, the Iowa Supreme 
Court said, nAssumption sf risk involves more or less 
deliberation, whereas contributory negligence implies lack 
of care, and hence absence of deliberate choice. tt 3 
Again to be considered is the age of the plaintiff. A 
child is not expected to have the same powers of determining 
the reasonableness of a particular situation and the law may 
deny his capability of accepting a given risk. 
Unavoidable accident is an event which has occurred 
without fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection 
on the part of the defendant. The defense of unavoidable 
l ~ o ~ ~ e t t  v. Chicago B. 2. R. E.. 195 I o w a  423, 792 
N.W. 255. 
2 Marean v. Peterson, --- , Iowa --- , 144 N.W. 2d 906 
(7907) 
'~dwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N.W. 875 (1939). 
2 1 
7 accident is a permitted one in Iowa, if defendant can prove 
that he did not contribute to the accident the jury could 
reasonably conclude that the misadventure was a mere accident 
or an unaveidable accident. 2 
An act of God may be raised as a defense provided the 
defendant can shew that the loss was created by an inevitable 
accident in which the defendant played no part. On the other 
hand, when an act of God csmbinea er concurs with the negli- 
gence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant 
is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his 
own negligent conduct or omission. 3 
To avoid any possible confusien with the rule of 
immunity as it applies te quasi-corporations, such as school 
districts in Iowa, it should be specifically noted that 
immunity for negligence may not apply to employees of the 
quasi-corporation. In Montanick v. McMillin, the Iowa 
Supreme Court stated: 
Liability of Fred McMillin (county employee) is 
not predicated upon any relationship growing out of 
his employment, but is based upon the fundamental 
and underlying law af torts, that he who does injury 
ts the person or property of another is civilly 
liable in damages for the injury inflicted. The 
1 Schevers v. American R. - Exp. - - Co., 795 Iowa 423, 192 
N.W. 2 5 5 m  
2~agaman v. Ryan, Iewn, 142 N.W.2d 413 ( 1966 ) .  
338 &I. Jur., Negligence Set. 7 .  
exemption @f governmental bodies and their officers 
from liability under the doctrine of respendeat 
superior, is a limitation or exception to the rule 
of respondeat superior, and in no way affects the 
fundamental principle of torts that ene whe wrong- 
fully inflicts injury upon another is liable to 
the injured persen for damages. 1 
Cited by the ceurt was Goold v. Saunders, in which the 
court said: 
A public official nay be guilty ef negligence in 
the p e r f e m a c e  ef afficial duties, for which his 
official character gives him na immunity. Public 
service should not be a shield te protect a public 
servant from the consequences sf his personal 
misconduct. 2 
A distinction was made in Montiuzick v. McMillin between 
acts of nonfeasance and misfeasance. An act of misfeasance 
was defined as a positive wrong, for which every employee, 
whether eraplayed by a private persen er a municipal corpera- 
tion, is held to a duty net to injure another by a negligent 
act of commission. If only nonfeasance is present, ne 
liability exists regardless of to whom the duty is awed. 
3 
V. IMMUNITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS FROM TORT LIABILITY 
The csmmen law doctrine of "severeign i m i t y n  is 
usually referred to as ngovernmental immunityn in the United 
States and is well recognized as an integral theory of the 
'~entanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 208 N.W. 608 
(1938) 
2 Goold v. Saunders, 196 Iowa 380, 194 N.W. 227 (1923). 
3~ontanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 208 N.W. 608 
( 1  938) 
23 
law. In Heover v. Iowa State Highway Celmissien, the Iowa 
-
Supreme Court recognized the extension of the doctrine of 
sovereigzl immunity ints the common law of Iowa stating: 
Our English ancestors developed the theory of 
sovereign immunity, and they transmitted the doctrine 
down threugh the centuries te us. Here, the principle, 
when applied, must be invoked according to the state 
and Federal Ccnstitutiona...as a substitution for an 
absslute sovereignty and the divine right of the king. 
The Iowa Rules of Civil Precedure provide that the state 
may sue in the same way as an individual and that it may be 
sued as provided by any statutes in force at the The 
permission to be sued, hewever, is limited and generally a 
quasi-corporation, such as a school district, is immune from 
liability for damages.3 Care must be taken at this point to 
distinguish between a governmental or ministerial function 
and a proprietary function. The category of quasi-corpora- 
4 
tions includes counties and school  district^.^ Although a 
county is more easily recognized as an involuntary subdivision 
of the state, a school district is, without doubt, a quasi- 
corporation. The only case supporting a denial of absolute 
1 
Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 207 Iowa 56, 
58, 222 -38, w(1928). 
2 Iowa Code R.C.P.  9 (1965) 
--9 
3 ~ o v e r  v. Iowa High School Athletic Association - and 
Independent School District of Mason City, Iowa, 265 Iowa 337, 
127 N.W.2d 6'-64). - 
4 Cunningham v. Adair County, 190 Iowa 913, 181 N . W . 2 d  
(1921). 
School District, 230 Iowa 771, 
immunity to quasi-corporations is Wittmer v. ~etts, ' which 
held that a county w@uld be liable for the negligent opera- 
tion of a county hes~ital. The Supreme Court held that the 
operation of a county hospital is a proprietary function and 
that quasi-corporatisns are liable far the negligence of 
their employees in such a case. Whether the Supreme Ceurt 
will expand its scepe cannet be predicted at this time. 
The adherence af the courts te the doctrine ef immunity 
is largely a matter ef public palicy en the theory that school 
districts are carperatiens with limited pewers and act merely 
on behalf sf the state in discharging the duty of educating 
the children of school age in public schesls. The Iowa 
Supreme Court simply stated that immunity from liability for 
torts was largely a matter sf public pelicy, and noting a 
line of cases, held, the legislature, not the courts, 
2 
ordinarily determines the public policy. of the state. 
Other reasens cammanly given for the rule of non- 
liability of school districts is that they have no means to 
pay damages for tort claims, and that they are not given power 
to raise meney therefor. Further, that all funds placed under 
their control are appropriated by law for strictly school 
purposes, and cannot be diverted for any other purpose. 
3 
'248 Iowa 648, 80 N.W. 2d 561 (1957) .  
2 Boyer v. Iowa High Scheol Athletic Associatien - and 
Independent School District of Mason City, -9 Iosra 256  Iowa 337 ,  
127 N . W . 2 d  6 - 6 r  - 
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The common law g@vernmental immunity doctrine has been 
challenged in the courts time and again, but the doctrine 
prevails with strict application in the majority ef states 
I 
today. 
VI. LIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR THEIR TORTS 
Governaental immunity of schael districts has been 
abolished in the follswing states: Alaska, Arizona, Califer- 
2 
nia, Hawaii, Illinois, M i ~ e s o t a ,  (in 19631, Mew York, 
Washington, and   is cons in.^ In these statee, actions may be 
brought against a schsol district fer negligence in the 
perfsrmance ef a governmental or a proprietary function. 
Scheol districts in these states are liable for the negligent 
acts of employees committed in the scope of their employment. 
In other words, the doctrine ef respondeat superior is in 
effect. As a matter of legal practice and assuming a finding 
of negligence, both the school district and the employee would 
be jointly and severally liable. Generally, satisfaction 
would be obtained from the school district because it would 
have the funds with which to pay the judgment. 
'86 A.L.R. 2d Sec. 3 .  
2~ anel v. Meunds View Scheol Cemmunity Unit District, 
. %,*. E. Zd 89 7 1 9 5 9 r  
386 A.L.R. 2d Secs. 20, 21, 26, 29.  
Abregation of the rule of immunity has been 
accomplished either by statute or by judicial decision. 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, New Y o r k ,  and Washington pro- 
vided for the right of persons to sue school districts by 
7 2 4 
statutory change. Arizona, ~llinois ,3 Minnesota, and 
wisconein5 abolished the immunity rule by judicial decision. 
Many states, including these still retaining the 
rule of immunity, permit school districts, among other forms 
of muni cipal corporations, to purchase insurance for the 
purpose of paying judgments against the school district or 
an employee. Generally, if insurance is purchased, the 
district may be liable f o r  negligence in both governmental 
and proprietary functions only to the extent of the 
insurance policy. Statutory permission has been granted to 
state agencies in I o w a  to purchase liability insurance to 
protect against individual or corporate liability. The 
permissive purchase of insurance does not eliminate the 
'86 A.L.R. 2d Sec. 20, 21, 26, 2 9 .  
2 
Sawaya v. Tucson High School District, 78 Ariz. 389, 
3~olitor v. Kaneland Unit District No. E, 
18 Ill. 2d 1 1 ,  163 N.E. 2d 89 
4 
Spanel v. Mounds View School District, 264 Minn. 279, 
118 N.W. 2d 795 (1'- - 
5 ~ o l  tz v. City af Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 175 N.W. 
2d 618 (* 
immunity of the schsol district er relieve the individual 
employee from his liability for negligence. 7 
Mest of the reasons for immunity were censidered and 
rejected by the Illinois Supreme Ceurt in the Molitor caere. 
The opinion quotes with approval these statements from other 
decisiens attacking the dactrine: 
The whole doctrine af gavemental immunity from 
liability for tert rests upen a ratten foundatien. 
It is almost incredible that in this madern age ef 
comparative secielogical enlightenment, and in a 
republic, the medieval absolutism suppesed to be 
implicit in the maxim "the king can do no wrongu 
should exempt the varieus branches of the govern- 
ment fram liability from their torts, and that 
the entire burden of d m g e  resulting fram the 
wrongful acts of government sheuld be imposed 
upon the single individual who suffers the injury, 
rather than distributed among the entire community 
cornstitutin the gevernment and where it justly 
belongs.. . . 1 
Some jurisdictiens have been able to distinguish a 
particular act as a praprietary function and have held that 
immunity weuld net apply ta that activity. It was held in 
Sauaya v. Tucson H i ~ h  Scheal ~ i s t r i c t , ~  that a scheal district 
acted in a preprietary functian when it leased its football 
stadium for compensation to anather schasl district, and 
that it was liable for an injury sustained as a result ef 
negligence in the maintenance of the stadium. 
'1.w Cede Sec. 517 A -  (1966)  
--
'~m1it.r v. Kansland District No. s, 
18 Ill. 2d 17, 163 N.E. 2d 89 
'sawaya v. Tucson High Schael District, 78 Ariz. 3 8 9 ,  
287 P. 2d 105 (1955).' 
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The adoptien ef "save harmlesstt statutes in New Jersey, 
Connecticut, and Wyeming and statutary permission fer the 
scheel district ta assume the liability of a teacher in 
Oregon and Massachusetts has effectively circumvented the 
doctrine ef immunity. 1 
V I I .  TRENDS IN LIABILITY LAWS IN OUR FIFY'Y STATES 
Since 1959 there has been a definite trend away from 
immunity; the difference ameng the jurisdictiens appearing 
to be one of velacity rather than philosophy. It is a matter 
of gradual eresion sf the dectrine versus immediate abelish- 
ment, with the additianal facter, in the latter case, whether 
abelishment is by judicial decisien ar legislative action. 
2 
In 7959, ceurts in two states, Illinois, and 
 isc cons in,^ abalished the tart immunity ef school districts. 
Minnesota, in 1962, gave notice thraugh its Supreme Caurt 
that it did net intend ts recognize gsvernmental immunity 
as a defense t e  tort claims against scheel districts after 
the adjsurnment ef the 1963 regular session af the state 
legislature. 4 
1 National Educatian Research Division, - lec.G. 
2~olitar v. Kaneland Cemmunity - Unit District No. 302, 
78 Ill. 2d 795 ( 1 9 6 r  
3 ~ a l  tz v. City sf Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 
2 d  618 (* 
4 Spanel v. Mounds View School District, 264 Minn. 
2 7 9 ,  118 N . W .  2d 7 9 5 6 T  
Municipal tart immunity has been abolished in twelve 
states since 1957.' While this does net directly affect the 
immunity of the school districts necessarily, it weuld seem 
tm be aeme indication ef the attitude of the courts of the 
respective states taward the immunity doctrine. 
In Boyer v. Iowa High Scheol Athletic Associatien, the 
Supreme Ceurt sf Iowa, by a five to feur decision, declined 
to a b ~ l i s h  governnental immunity at that time. Chief Justice 
Garfield, who wrate the majarity apinien, pointed te language 
in several Iowa statutes which he said demonstrated legis- 
lative recognition of the immunity dactrine. In view ef such 
recognition, it was the majerity opinion that abolition of the 
immunity dactrine was a matter for legislative rather than 
2 judicial action. The dissent, written by Justice Moore, 
preferred ceurt abolishment, citing Haynes v. Presbyterian 
Hospital ~ s s o c i a t i o n , ~  in which the c a n t  abrogated the 
doctrine of immunity ef charitable institutiens for 
negligence of its agents: 
The law's emphasis generally is on liability, 
rather than immunity, for wrengdeing. Charity is 
generally no defense. It is for the legislature, 
not the ceurts, to create and grant immunity. The 
-1 
J. Robert Hard, "Liability of Public Bodies, Officers, 
and Empleyees, 1 7 Drake Law Review 79 (1962) . 
2 
I o w a  337, 127 N.W. 2d 
3Haynes v. Prssb terian Hospital Association, 241 I o w a  
1269,  45 N.W. 2d 1- 
fact that the courts may have at am early date, in 
response to what appeared good as a matter of policy, 
created an immunity does not appear te us a sound 
reason for continuing the same when under all legal 
thories it is basically unsound, and especially so 
when the reasans upon which it was built ne longer 
exist. 
It is our responsibility to alter decisional law 
to produce c e m o n  sense justice. As to the doctrine 
of governmental immunity we have already waited too 
long. I would join the yast majerity of the other 
courts in abrogating it. 
The Iswa legislature, in passing the Iewa Tort Claims 
Act permitting the state to be sued, has indicated its 
feeling about the doctrine ef gevernmentsl immunity.2 This 
leaves Iewa in the position of having abolished immunity 
for the "sovereignn body the state, and continuing immunity 
for derivative ppvernnental bodies including schoel districts. 
Ne other canclusion can be drawn from the changes 
that have taken place since 1959,  but that the doctrine of 
immunity will be subjected to additisnal attacks, both by 
the legislatures and the courts of the several states. 
1 
Beyer v. Iowa Hi h School Athletic Association, 256 
-+=- I o w a  337, 127 N.W. 2d 06 (19 
2 w ~ e w a  Tort Claims Act," Acts. 61 G.A. (1965) Ch. 791. 
CHAPTER I1 
LIABILITY IN THE SELECTED AREA OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
Accidents in the physical education classes are 
numerous and result from a variety of causes. Court cases 
relating ts the field ef physical education indicate that 
pupi l inJuries occur when gymnasium equipment is defective, 
the play area is evercrowded, there is inadequate super- 
vision ef the exercise or sufficient warning of its dangers, 
the instruction is net sufficient, other pupils conduct 
themselves in a negligent manner, and where pupils are 
spectators at sports events, 
The physical education teacher is under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries 
and te assign pupils to such activities as were 
within their abilities, and to properly and 
adequately constitutes actionable negligence on 
the part of the teacher. 1 
I. ACCIDENTS IM THE RELATED AREA OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
Statistical studies indicated that perhaps the greatest 
number of school accidents eccurred in physical education or 
2 
in activities related directly to this field. 
In 1960, public junior high schools were selected at 
'~ea.n K. Dissinger, nAccidents in Junior High School 
Physical Education Programs," Research Quarterly, XXXVII 
(~ecember, 1966) , 495. 
random frem directories published by the state department sf 
public instruction in the state of Iewa, Illinois, Seuth 
Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Missouri, fer 
the purpose of investigation sf the incidents, resulting 
injuries, and prevalent causes ef accidents in public high 
schools. 1 
This study investigated the incidence, resultant 
injuries, and prevalent causes ef accidents in 207 
public junior high schaols. Data evinced that three- 
fifths of the 1,626 accidents occurred either in 
physical education or in activities related directly 
to this field. Activities respensible for the 
greatest percentage of accidents te both sexes and 
or accidents to boys only were basketball, football, 
softball, and baseball. Uppermost for girls were 
basketball, volleyball, and stunts and tumbling. 
Accidents pervading interscholastic practice, inter- 
school games, and intramurals induced higher severity 
indexes than did accidents in the physical education 
classroom. Activities incurring the more severe 
student injuries were wrestling, foetball , and track. 
Diagnozed in the highest percentage of cases were the 
sprain, fracture, and bruise. The extremities were 
the parts of the body involved most frequently. 
Prevalent irmnediate causes of injury were falling, 
striking, or b e h g  struck by play equipment, and 
collision. Evidence relating to predisposing cause 
proved inconclusive. 2 
Public school authorities are entrusted with the 
safety of students during school hours, and the physical 
education teacher, who does not enjoy inmunity from legal 
liability in Iowa, must be alert to guard against accidents 
and injuries. 3 
3 ~ i h t o l  v. Crow, D.C. (Iowa) 799 F. Supp. 682 (1961). 
The liability of teachers in physical education is no 
greater than for other teachers but oppertunities 
far injury 
are greater. Injuries may result from equipment, curriculum, 
supervision, first aid, and transportation. 
Equipment. What is meant by athletic apparatus of 
appliance or equipment? A 7949 case would illustrate the 
court 's interpretation of this term. The plaintiff was 
in,jured during lunch heur while playing "keep awayn in the 
schoolyard with a football. He was tackled by another pupil 
and the participants in the game piled en the plaintiff. The 
court stated: 
Our inquiry is narrewed down to the question of 
whether the foetball awned by the scheal district 
and furnished to the pupils in the instant case is 
te be censidered an "athletic apparatus or appliance". 
In making determination of this question, we note 
firat, that in a bread, general sense, a foetball 
might be considered to be athletic apparatus or 
appliance. When, however, the relation of the words 
used, as to each ether, and the text of the statute 
as a whale are caref'ully studied, we think that the 
most reaeonable interpretation ef what the legislature 
intended by the words "athletic apparatusn is that it 
had reference te some sort of mere or less permanently 
located equipment, such as swings, slides, traveling 
rings, teeterbaards, chinning bars, and se ferth, and 
net something as highly mobile as a foetball. The 
words "situated," "operated," and "maintained," as 
they are used in the statute in reference to "athletic 
apparatus or appliance," lend credence to this inter- 
pretation, for it is certainly incorrect to refer to 
a feetball as being nsituated, operated, er maintainedn 
by such schoel district. ' 
1 
Briscee v. School District E. 123 Grays Harbeur 
County, 201 P2d 6 9 7 ( 1 9 4 9 )  
34 
It was held by the Washingtan Supreme Caurt, that an 
injured spectatsr be allawed to recever for damages suffered 
when struck by a baseball thrown by a member of a high scherl 
team. A state statute precluded lawsuits against a school 
distrfct for injuries related te an athletic apparatus er 
appliance. The court said that the baseball was not within 
the scepe ef the statute. 1 
The courts have held that one ef the firat responsi- 
bilities ef the physical educatien teacher is to make certain 
equipment being used is free f r o m  defects. Many items sf 
physical education equipment, presumed safe, have been de- 
fective ar have not been used preperly. Their construction 
or maintenance have been faulty or the equipment has been 
placed in an unsafe lacatien resulting in pupil injuries and 
2 
liability suits against the teacher. 
Another cause of injury through equipment was the 
failure of the physical educatien teacher to previde mats 
where their need was clearly indicated. A frequent seurce 
ef injury was the failure te pravide mats in proper places  
such as on a brick wall used as the finish line of a race, 3 
'~arnecut v. Seattle Scho.1 District, e. 2 ,  389P 2d 
904 ( 1 9 6 r  
2 
Fein v. Baard rf Education, 1951 Supp., 101) N . Y . S .  2d 
996 ( 1 9 5 T -  
3~atterschinsky v. Beard ef Education, New York City, 
215 A p p .  D i v .  695, 272 N . Y .  Supp. 424 ( 1 9 2 5 )  
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7 en the floor used fer gymnastic stunts, and areund the base 
of gymnastic equipment and areas where wrestling was carried 
en. 
2 
A p i m e ,  impreperly suppsrted, alse resulted in a 
pupil injury,3 gymnasium leckers which were negligently 
4 installed, maintained, and inspected, fell an a student, and 
in an Oregon case, an injury eccurred when radiators were 
impreperly pretected and padded.5 The use of unslaked lime 
en the playing fields in Minneseta effected a law suit. 6 
A recent case concerning equipment eccurred in 
Minnesota, March, 1965. During a physical education activity, 
a secend grade child stepped en a jump rope while jumping and 
pulled the woeden handle of the repe out ef the teacher's 
hand. This waeden handle struck the child. Suit was brought 
against the teacher for negligence on the part ef the teacher. 
The court held that the evidence failed ts establish any 
'~enbareri v. Beard ef Education of Albany, 246 App. 
Div. 127, 284 N.Y. Supp. 892(7936), affirmed 282 N.Y. 741. 
2 
Fein v. Board of Educatien, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1951). 
3~avson v Tulsre High School District, 98 Cal. App. 
138, 2'76-4 241.929~. 
4 Freund v. Oakland Board Education, 28 Cal. App. 2d 
246, 82 P. 2d 197 sm
5 ~ p e c e r  v. School District, 121 Oregon 51 1,  254 P. 3-57 
(1927). 
6 Mokovich v. Independent Schaal District, 177 Minn.445, 
225 ~.~.-29). 
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actionable negligence on the part of the teacher since this 
was a rope of the type normally used by children in jumping 
rope. It was the court's opinion that the teacher could not 
have anticipated that the rape, six feet in length, if 
stepped upon would have resulted in the wooden handle 
striking the child causing injury. 1 
Many equipment concerns are cared for immediately by 
the physical education teacher, but in other instances, if 
the board of education is informed of the dangerous situation 
of defective equipment it is responsible for its correction. 
It is important that the physical education teacher inform 
the proper authority about a dangerous situation that needs 
to be corrected, as this constitutes the requirement of "due 
caren on the part of the physical educator. 2 
Curriculum. The problem of the content of the physical 
education curriculum subjecting students to unduly dangerous 
or unreasonable requirements has been raised in the courts 
resulting in decisions of significant consequence to the 
physical education curriculum. These cases were outside the 
state of Iowa, but their rulings could affect future Iowa 
cases in the area of curriculum. 
A 1938 California court, after three hearings, ruled 
a pupil could recover from a school district for damages 
 ire -v. Williams, --- ,Minn. ,--- , 133 N.W. 2d 840 ( 1 9 6 5 ) .  
* 3 8  Am. - - Jur., Negligence Sec. 15.  
sustained in performing the tumbling exercise, 
two", in a regular physical education class since the 
exercise was unsuitable for high schaol girls. The court 
said: 
In whether the employees of the appellant 
(scha~l district) used ordinary care, it was proper 
for the jury t@ cansider net enly whether the exercise 
was inherently dangerous, but also whether they should 
have allowed or required the respondent to take in- 
struction in tumbling. It is a matter of csramon 
knowledge that some students show much more aptitude 
fsr athletics than do others. Some...find games or 
stunts of any kind difficult. Frequently students of 
the same age have different capacities for physical 
training. Alss, some forms of exercise are considered 
entirely preper for boys while too strenuous or other- 
wise undesirable for girls. In the exercise of ordinary 
care, it was the duty ef the teachers employed by the 
school district to take all of these factors, with 
others, ints consideration in determining the kind of 
instruction to be given the respondent ... Under the 
circumstances shown in this case the issue of negli- 
gence was solely one for the determination of the 
jury.. . . 
While it dees not lie within the province of the 
jury te deternine whether a certain subject should be 
taught, school authorities may be guilty of negligence 
in requiring a student to take a particular course of 
study. 1 
There was a dissent in this case and one judge vigorous- 
ly disagreed with the opinion sf the court, citing that juries 
laymen in California became the compesers of permissible 
courses of study in physical education. The judge stated: 
It seems to me the majority has totally disregarded 
the rights of boards of education and trustees of school 
districts to provide courses in physical education in 
accordance with power vested in them by the law of the 
1 Bellman v. Sari Francisco High School District, 1 1  C a l .  
2 d  5 7 6 ,  81 P2d 274 - m 3 r  
state, and has placed within the power of a jury to 
say whether such courses should be pursued....Courses 
in physical education will thus be curtailed or 
eliminated, depending upon the degree of wguessv in- 
dulged in by the school authorities on what a jury 
would say about it.. . . 
... Every athletic event, the R.O.T.C., the courses 
in physics, chemistry, the simple game of tennis or 
hockey--even the old-fashiened "wandff exercises--would 
likewise be ninherently dangerousn because injury might 
result in any of them. Is it intended to hold that the 
ceurts and not the school authorities should determine 
what courses of instruction should be given? 1 
In New York, a sdmilar case arose which allowed a pupil 
in an elementary grade to recover damages for a head-stand 
exercise injury. The exercise was described by the court as 
an unreasonable one. 2 
Executing a tumbling exercise during a regular physical 
education class, a pupil sustained injuries to her leg. It 
was claimed that the physical education teacher was negligent 
in directing the student to do an exercise which the teacher 
knew the student could not perform, in failing to properly 
instruct the student, and in refusing the student's protests. 
3 
The lower court dismissed this case on the grounds 
that the school district was immune under statute. However, 
lgellman v. Sari Francisco High School District, 1 1  
Cal. 2 P 2d 2-• 
'~ardner v. State of New York, 256 App. Div. 385,  lo 
N.Y. Supp. 2d 274 (1939). 
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 401 P. 2d 
39 
the pupil appealed, and the court held that the cited statute 
did not bar the action. The court stated that the injury 
resulted not from negligent equipment, but from acts requiring 
the student to perform stunts she was known incapable of 
~erfcrming safely. The judgment of the lower court was 
7 reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
These cases illustrate the effect of juries determining, 
to a degree, the content of physical education classes as to 
what exercises are proper for certain pupils. 
Supervision. Lack of proper supervision is negligence, 
thus making a teacher personally liable for pupil injury. 
Under the doctrine "in loco parentis," the teacher takes the 
place of the parent in exercising the care that a parent of 
ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances. 
Too little, mr improper supervision are important in con- 
sidering the degree ef supervision which constitutes negligence. 
This is an area of concern f o r  physical education teachers 
since accidents can happen no matter how close the supervision. 
The question to be answered is whether or not the supervision 
Provided is adequate for the particular situation. 
The ceurts have defined "the standard of caren owed by 
teachers te their pupils as follews: 
A teacher's relationship to the pupil under his 
care and custody differs frem that generally existing 
between a public employee and a member of the general 
public. In a limited sense, the teacher stands in 
the parent's place in his relationshTp to a pupil... 
And has such a portion of the pewers of the parent 
over the pupil as is necessary to carry mut his 
employment. In such relationship, he owes his pupils 
the duty ef supervisien....If the teacher is liable 
for misfeasance, we find na sound reassn wh 
should not be also held for nsnfeasance. .. . 7 he 
Liability was found against teachers where the general 
rule of tort immunity for the scheol district prevailed, as 
in Iowa, and against school agencies where there was an 
absence of such immunity. Teachers were found liable for 
failing to supervise properly pupils crossing a public 
2 
street, not locking a gymnasium, which when left unsupervised 
was dangerous for children, allowing an injured student to 
4 
participate in a f ~ ~ t b a l l  game, and for failure of a teacher 
to be on the school grounds. 5 
A negligence actisn was brought against a teacher in 
Vermont charging that the standard of care owed by teachers 
to pupils under their care and supervision was lacking. This 
2 
Eastman v. Williams, 207 A . 2 d  746, VT. Sup. C t .  (1965). 
3~ongo v. Board of Education, 235 APP. D i v a  733,  255 
N.Y. Supp. 719 ( 1 9 3 1 )  
4 
Morris v. Union Hi h School District A, King County, 
160 Wash. 121, 2.94 P. 99&971).- 
50rando v. School District, 24 C a l .  ~ p p .  2d 
5 6 7 ,  75 P. 2d 641 
was a question not previously decided in Vermont. In this 
suit, a nine year old child was injured on a merry-go-round 
platform which had a three-inch piece of board missing on 
one part of its edge and a small hole through the floor near 
its center. The child claimed he was injured when he stepped 
through the hole, although how he was injured was a matter of 
conflict among the child, his parents, and the teacher on 
duty. The court held that the presence of the hole should 
have caused a prudent person to foresee harm and the Judgment 
in favor of the teacher was reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 1 
While on a school outing in Oregon, a six year old 
child was crushed by a log which was rolled by a large wave 
as it surged up on the beach. The courts held the teacher 
negligent in failing to exercise proper supervision at the 
time of the accident, since it was common knowledge that 
accidents of this type had occurred along the Oregon coast 
and therefore the accident was foreseeable, 
2 
In New York, a physical education teacher was liable 
for allowing two boys, lacking in instruction, to engage each 
other in boxing resulting in a serious injury to one of the 
boys. 3 
'~astrnan v. Williams, 207 11.26 146, Vt. Sup. Ct. (1965).  
2M0rris Y. Douglas County School District &. 2, 403 
p.2d 7 7 5 ( 1 9 6 5 )  
v. Stanford, 272 APP Div. 1 8 3 ,  70 N . Y . S .  2 d  
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* participant in a baseball game was injured when he 
tripped over a spectator and fell on a bench while attempting 
to catch a foul ball. The game was supervised by officials. 
The court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to damages 
since the officials were negligent in not ordering the crowd 
back from the playing area. 1 
It was noted by the court in New Y o r k  where a five 
year old child was injured in a fall from a swing while under 
the school's supervision, that the school only had a duty to 
guard against foreseeable injuries. This was not a foresee- 
able occurrence. k! 
In 1967, it was also held for a school board that 
"general supervisionn by a teacher was all that was required. 3 
Schools have a duty to provide adequate supervision if 
pupils are required to remain outside the school building 
between tests. 4 
Courts have generally agreed that the responsibility 
for supervision must not become toe strict or severe lest it 
lead to unreasonable curtailment of physical education 
activities. 
 omin ins v. Mercurio, 234 N.Y.S.2d 1041 (7962). 
'~lein v. Hoffman, 75 App. Div.2d 899 N.Y. (1961). 
3Neator v. City of New Yark, 217 N.Y.S.2d N . Y .  (1961). 
4 Cianci V. Board of Education, 238 N.Y.S.2d 547 N.Y.s. 
(1 963) . 
What constitutes negligence is a question of fact 
in all cases. A greater degree of care is required 
in some situations than in others. 
The detemination of whether the acts complained of are negligent is by 
the jury. The best protection from liability a teacher 
has lies in the use of extreme care in all cases in 
which it is passible for pupil injury to occur. 1 
Supervision 2 Student Teachers. The legal status of 
non-certified personnel in assisting with teaching or in 
supervising students has raised a question of liability. 
In New York, a senior at a state teacher's college, 
who had completed a course in tests and measurements in 
physical education, administ0red.a fitness test to an appli- 
cant for admission to the college. The applicant's knee was 
injured during one of the tests. The court ruled that the 
college staff awed the duty of reasonable care in administering 
the tests and that in permitting a uncertified student to 
administer the tests, the college staff violated this care. 
2 
A few states have established the status of 
personnel. Student teachers in California are issued 
a temporary certificate by the county superintendent 
of schools. In Oregon, student teachers have the same 
status as regular teachers. In Connecticut, student 
teachers are protected under the "save harmlessn 
statute. The status of student teachers in most 
jurisdictions is not clear. A common definition of a 
teacher is a certified person employed by a board of 
education. In general, student teachers are not 
employed. What then is the relationship between a 
student teacher and a board of education?; and between 
a student teacher and his pupils?. . . . 
In those jurisdictions having common law immunity, 
would the supervising teacher be liable? 1s he 
responsible for the negligence of his assistant (s) ? 
7 
Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and 
Public Education (~rooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1 9 5 9 ) .  
P *  295. 
2 
Britton v. State, 10) N.Y.S.2d 485 N.Y. (1951). 
The attorney general of Arizona has ruled that-- 
"A school district may not employ nsn-certified 
people to supervise playgrounds during recess and 
6ther intemissi@ns, but we do not believe that the 
law does not prevent non-certified people from being 
employed to assist a certified teacher in the super- 
vision of playgrounds so long as the teacher is 
present and supervising the assiatant....The same 
answer would apply t a the employment of non-certified 
people in the supervision of children in the cafeteria. 
A certified teacher must be present and in complete 
contra1 ef the non-certified pmployees, so that the 
supervision will be actually under the personal 
direction of the certified teacher. l1 (opinion No. 
63-271~,~196, March 13, 1963).' 
In Iowa, school districts have governmental immunity, 
rl 
but school personnel are liable for their acts of negligence. 
Therefore, an injured pupil could bring action against the 
supervising teacher, the assistant teacher, and possibly the 
educational institution which furnished the assistant teacher. 
dictate what a reasonably prudent and careful physical 
education teacher should do under these and similar 
circumstances. 1 
The general principle governing action or inaction is 
that one is not under a legal duty to go to the aid of another 
unless he is in some way at fault in causing his injury, or 
unless there is some definite relationship between the parties 
2 that is regarded as imposing a duty to act. 
This legal duty is imposed upon physical educators 
for two reasons. Our courts have consistently held 
that teachers stand -- in loco parentis to a pupil, which 
means that they have a parent Is duties and responsi- 
bilities while the child is at school. They are 
obligated by this relationship to render the best 
assistance they can. Secondly, since all physical 
educators must take and successfully pass a course in 
first aid as part of their formal preparation, it 
would seem to qualify them with the knowledge and 
skill to render first aid in an emergency. 
The obligation to render first aid incumbent upon 
the physical educator in an emergency is a duty to 
administer first aid and nothing more than first aid. 
The responsibility extends only to an emergency situa- 
tion....What constitutes emergency treatment depends 
upon the na ure of the injury, and the surrounding 
conditions. f 
A quarterback suffered an injury to his back during a 
pre-season high school football scrinnnage. Unable to get up, 
the coach tested the player for a neck &nJury which proved, 
1 
Sondra Y. Gold and Gerald F. Gold, "First Aid and 
Leeal Liability," Journal of Health--Physical Education-- 
Recreation, W X I V  ( J a n u a r y F l m 4 2 .  
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at this time, negative. The plaintiff was then carried from 
the field by other players. It was the medical opinion that 
the plaintiff's removal caused damage to his spinal cord 
resulting in his permanent quadriplegic condition. 
This 
negligent removal aggravated the original injury and the 
court awarded the plaintiff, $206,804.00, plus interests and 
1 
costs. 
A child was injured and subsequently died from loss 
of blood when a vein was cut as his arm went through a glass 
door while playing at recess. The court stated that the 
teacher was negligent in not being present so that first aid 
measures could have been taken to stop the flow of blood. 
The implication from this case was that first aid services 
were required of teachers. 2 
The physical educator, just as any other teacher, 
stands in a special relationship to his pupils which 
the law recognizes and therefore holds him responsible 
for the safety and well-being of the pupil. In the 
past few decades, there has been an increase in the 
importance of physical education and recreation in the 
school curriculum for both boys and girls from the 
elementary to the college levels. This newly acquired 
prestige has been a widening of the physical education 
program to include many new sports and activities 
requiring the use of special apparatus and equipment. 
With the new emphasis on physical fitness in our school 
curriculums, the greater number of students required 
to participate, and the more varied programs, it is 
'welch v. Dunsmuir Joint Union High School District, 
326 ~ . 2 d = c a l . m  
20gando v. School District, 24 Cal. App. 2d 
567, 75 P. 2d 641 
imperative that the physical educator know the 
rudiments of first aid and, what ig more important, 
how to apply them in an emergency. 
Sending a player, who was ill, into a game was held a 
grossly negligent act on the part of a coach, 2 
Where proper medical treatment was alleged to have 
caused further injury, the court held that the burden of 
proof rested with the plaintiff in showing that the treatment 
deviated from accepted standarder. 3 
To determine whether first aid was performed in a 
negligent manner, the court will apply the "reasonable m a n n  
tbst. The physical education teacher's actions are measured 
by the court as to what a reasonable and prudent and careful 
physical education teacher under like circumstances would do. 
Physical education teachers, because of their training 
in first aid, should not hesitate to administer it in the 
manner which is approved by the American Red Cross. If they 
undertake their duty in a careful and prudent manner, having 
regard to the proper procedures of first aid, they need not 
worry about a subsequent lawsuit based On their negligence- 
4 
 old and Gold, e. G. 
 orris v. Union H i g h  School District, No. 9, 403 P2d 
775 ( 1 9 6 r  
3 ~ e n r i c h  v. City of Newark, 181 A . 2 d  25 N.J. (1962). 
 o old and G o l d ,  x. a., p .  42. 
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It is possible that if a physical education teacher 
in Iowa undertook to provide treatment for a sick or injured 
pupil even though he would net be required by law to provide 
treatment, he is then bound to act with reasonable prudence 
and care to the end that if hi8 effert be unavailing it shall 
at least not operate to increase the injury which he seeks to 
alleviate. 1 
Transpert ation. The legal prablems involved in the 
use ef private automobiles for transporting pupils to 
athletic contests presents legal danger far the physical 
education teacher. The ceurts have consistently ruled that 
the teacher may be held liable for damages if gross negligence 
is proved. 
In I o w a ,  there exists a 'guest statute' which protects 
drivers, (teacher-driver) from suits by persons conveyed 
gratuitously. However, if the driver is guilty af reckless- 
ness, he may be liable. 2 
Iowa, which has governmental immunity, resolved the 
problem of transportation by allowing school districts to 
purchase insurance to protect drivers or other employees 
with respect to negligence in transporting pupils on school 
buses. This does not apply to the use of private motor 
'carey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N.W. 889. 
'1owa - -' Code Sec. 321.494 (1965). 
vehicles for transporting pupils to and from schosl activities 
and it is recommended that school districts use school dis- 
trict owned or public utilities commissioned licensees. 
1 Private transportation involves too many risks. 
If it is necessary to use private transportation, the 
following are highly important: 
1. Select drivers with extreme care. Do not use 
those who are on probation or who have nbad 
reputationsH as drivers, 
2. Check the kinds and amounts of insurance on the 
car. Be certain that coverage is complete and 
adequate, 
3. Determine, if you are able, the status of pass- 
engers in the car(s) on the trip. Are they 
"guestsn or not. 
4. If a student is a driver, have a mature adult in 
each car. 
5. Give complete instruct1 ons for the trip--driving 
speed, route, meeting places, etc. 
6. Beware of the "general fitnessn of the car(s) , 
tires, lights, wipers, etc. 
7. If the owner-driver of the car is a school employed, 
is the trip within the scope of the employee's 
empleyment ?2 
The u p e a t  statuten, subject to court interpretation, 
m a k e n  it important for the teacher-driver to know the status 
ef passengers being transported in private cars. Are they 
ngueatsn?; if so, proof of willful and wanton negligence an 
behalf of the driver may constitute liability; if not, mere 
negligence may result in liability. 3 
1 
Leibee, 9. G., p. 54. 
2 ~ b i d  0 , P O  67-  
'=ova Code, S e c .  321.494 (1907) 
The Iowa Supreme Ceurt has stated: 
If the carriage sf a person confers a benefit 
only on the person to whom the ride is given and no 
benefit other than such as are incidental to 
hospitality, companionship, or the like, upon the 
person extending the invitation, the passenger is 
a guest within the statut8s.l 
Cheerleaders, who were transported to a school athle- 
tic event, were denied recovery under the "guest statutew 
in Iowa, since the driver was not paid for his services. 
Because the passengers were mguests'l, proof of recklessness 
as distinguished from mere negligence was required. The 
driver had the consent of the owner of the car, his father, 
and was given permission and safety instruction from the 
athletic director. 2 
However, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a student 
transported during scheol time by another student, who had 
the consent of his father to use the automobile, was not a 
guest in the autamobile under the "guest statuten. It was 
held that the pupil enjoyed the status of a person riding a 
school bus and that the liability was on the driver of the 
car, not the owner. The student-driver did not receive any 
compensation for his driving services. 3 
The Delaware court allowed a pupil being transported 
by a teacher to a doctor, at the mother's request, to recovez 
'~odaken v. L o ~ a n ,  254 Iowa 230, 117 N . W . 2 d  470 (1962) 
2 
Fessenden v. Smith, 124 N . W . 2 d  554, Iowa (1964). 
3~itael v. Atkeson, 245 P . 2 d  170, Kansas (1952). 
damages. The court ruled that the teacher received benefit 
and compensation for performing this duty through his salary 
and thus the pupil was not considered a guest under the 
"guest statutem. I 
Allowing pupils te be transported home from a jUni0r 
college credit tennis course in a defective car resulted in 
an automobile accident a n d  subsequently a suit against the 
tennis coach. The court pointed out that the tennis 
instructor had "implied powern to provide transportation for 
the class, but failed to exercise "due caren in carrying out 
2 
his responsibilities. 
It can be seen from the cases discussed that the 
individual coach, teacher, automobile owner or driver 
is subject to the usual rules governing tort liability 
when transporting students, and must exercise the re- 
quired degree of care if he is to avoid the serious 
legal consequences of an injurious or fatal accident. 
It is highly important for school personnel to know 
whether or not each has protection in these and similar 
circumstances. Protection through the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, permissive legislation, save harm- 
less statutes, or state education association insurance- 
if pupils are transported in privately-owned motor 
vehicles to and from school sponsored activities. If 
not, then it is strongly recommended that each pro- 
vides himself with ade uate insurance-adequate 
coverages and amounts. 3 
'~ruitt v. Gaines, 317 F.2d 461, Delaware (1963) .  
2 Hanson v. Reed1 School District, 43 Cal. App.2d 
643, I (  
II. INSURANCE 
Recognition of the personal liability of a physical 
education teacher should suggest to the individual teacher 
the wisdom of obtaining personal insurance coverage. 
There 
are at least two alternative methods for the acquisition of 
liability insurance readily available to a teacher in Iowa. 
The Iowa State Education Association provides liability 
coverage for each active member of the organization and to 
student members involved in student practice teaching. The 
policy promises to pay on behalf of the insured member, all 
sums (up to the policy limit of $150,000) which he shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily 
inJury, sickness, or disease, including death, sustained by 
any person, and damages to property, arising out of an 
occurrence in the course of his duties as an instructor, 
member of a faculty or teaching staff. Specifically excluded 
are losses involving the use of automobiles, an injury 
intentionally caused, except for corporal punishment, if the 
administration of corporal punishment is not prohibited by 
state law,' It should be noted, as a matter of interest, 
that corporal punishment is not prohibited in ~ o w a . ~  The 
 orac ace M a n n  Mutual Insurance Company, Springfield, 
Illinois, Master Policy No. Iowa 2 E U ,  Certificate of 
Coverage, I.S.E.A. Members. 
'Tinkhan v. - Kale, 452 Iowa 1303, 1 1 0  N.W.2d 258 (1961). 
punishment must be reasonable in degree considering all the 
I circumstances. 
Business pursuits endorsements to hornearners and 
comprehensive personal liability policies can be secured from 
many of the private insurance companies. A teacher need only 
request, of his insurance agent, that the endorsement be 
added to an existing insurance policy. The coverage afforded 
is basically the same as the insurance available through the 
Iowa State Education Associatien. 
111. STANDARDS FOR A REASONABLE, PRUDENT 
AND CAREFUL PHYSICAL EDUCATOR 
An important consideration in the teaching of physical 
education is the standards established by the individual 
teacher. If these standards or cedes are follewed, many of 
the accidents resulting fram lack of @lforeseeabilitylf might 
be eliminated. 
A teacher of physical education should have a proper 
teacher's certificate in full force and effect, operate and 
teach at all times within the scope of his employment as 
delimited and defined by the rules and regulations sf the 
employing board of education and within the statutery 
2 
limitations impesed by the state. 
2~rthur J. Muniz, *The Teacher, Pupil Injury, and 
Legal Liability," Journal of Health-Physical Bducation- 
Recreation, X , I X  ( S e p t e m b e r , ,  28. 
A safety code far the physical education teacher in 
Iowa might be: 
the health status of his studenta and/er 
players if he has them engage in highly 
cempetitive and/or rough activities. 
2 Required medical approval for participation 
following serieus illness or injury. 
3 .  Inspects all claes and personal gquipmgnt at 
regular intervals . 
4. Daea not expese students to possible injury by 
using defective equipment. 
5. Conducts an activity in a safe area. 
6. Forseea possible injury if activity is conducted 
thusly. 
7. Analyzes hie teaching and coaching methods for the 
safety of the students and players. 
8. Assigns only qualified personnel to cenduct ar 
supervise an activity. 
9. Keeps the activity within the ability of a student. 
70. Perfems the proper actian in the event of injury. 
(1) Renders first aid (2) Sutfn!nons medical attention 
and (3) Remeves injured to medical attention 
(1) er (1) and (2) or (1 )  and (3) or (2) or (3) 
11. Dee8 not diagnose or treat injuries. 
12. Instructs adequately prier to permitting ~ e r f 0 m m ~ ~ -  
13. Provides adequate protective equipment 
14. Keeps ac urate records ef all accidents and action(s)* 
taken. F 
TRENDS IN LIABILITY IN THE AREA OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION 
The great majority of states adhere to archaic doctrine 
'the King can do no wrong" - the King being the state or a 
2 
corperate subdivision thereof. 
"The courts and/or the legislatures in a number of 
states have taken a more realistic approach and have attempted 
to resolve or partially resolve the problem.. 
"3 
These approaches are: 
GROUP I. States in which governmental immunity 
of school districts have been abolished. 
ALASKA, ARIZITNA, CALIFORNIA, HAWAII, ILLINOIS, 
MINNESOTA 1960) , NEW YORK (CITY) , WASHINGTON, 
WISCONSIN EXCEPTIONS) 
In these states, the school district is liable 
for negligence in the performance sf a governmental 
act. The school district is also liable for the 
negligent acts of empleyees, and are jointly or 
severally liable. Action wsuld be brought against 
one or both.' 
GROUP 11. States in which school districts may 
purchase liability insurance to protect the districts 
against claims arising from negligent acts for which the 
districts are respogsible or assume responsibility as 
a matter of policy.& 
Is Immunity Waived by such Purchase? 
Na Yes 





















X Extent of Policy 
X Extent of Policy 
x Completely 
x Extent of Policy 
Completely 3 
GROUP 111. States in which school districts may 
purchase liability insurance protecting their employees 
against claims arisin~ out of employees' negligence.' 
Is District's Irmmznity Waived by such Purchase? 



























x Extent of Policy 
Abolished2 
Abolished 
GROUP IV. Ailether procedure used to protect employees 
of school districts is found in seven (7) states - the 
"save harmlessn procedure. -' 








'=bid, - p.  29. 
2~bid., - pp. 29-30 
GROUP V. States which have legislated a method of 
recovery other than common tort law action.' 
Alabama State Beard of Adjustments 
Hawaii State Tort Liab lity Act 
North Carolina Tort Claims Act 3 
GROUP VI. State education associations which have 
purchased liability insurance protecting members for 
negligent acts committed during the scope of their 



















The amounts of insurance range from $10,000.00 to 
The rule of governmental immunity from liability in 
torts is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. Cultural 
changes, however, have made our educational communities aware 
of the public's thrust in the law of school board liability. 
Generally, governmental immunity for tort liability prevailed, 
but over the years some states created statutory or judicial 
exceptions to this rule which subsequently made school 
districts responsible for their negligence. 
58 
Iowa has gov@-ental i m i t y  with school personnel 
liable for their acts of negligence. 
The trend in school district liability decisions is 
outside the state of Iowa but it could have a definite 
relationship to future judicial decisions in Iowa on school 
liability. 
The methods of change in liability are; the abolishment 
by some states of the doctrine of immunity; authorization of 
school boards to purchase insurance to cover liability; 
establishment of state boards of adjustments; "saver harmless" 
procedure to protect the schoel district employee* 
CHAPTER 111 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It was the purpose of this study to alert those 
individuals who are intrusted with the safety of students 
participating in physical education programs, to their 
legal duties and to aid in evaluating teaching practices 
and curriculum in light of the immaturity of the student 
and the importance of the teacher's trust. 
Under the American system of jurisprudence, each 
person has the right to be free from intentional or careless 
acts that may cause injury to this person or property. A 
physical education teacher must be aware of his potential 
tort liability, for if he is negligent in his conduct, in 
the performance of his duties, he will be legally responsible 
for injury that occurs. Damages assessed against him may 
require satisfaction from his personal funds. In Iowa, 
imrmrnity is afforded the school district by reason of the 
common law, which results in placing full responsibility on 
the physical educator for his acts. 
compounding the exposure of the physical education 
teacher is the content of the physical education curriculum. 
Although the liability of the teacher is no greater than that 
of any other person, the incidence of injury can be safely 
assumed to be higher because of the active nature of the 
60 
curriculum, resulting in the greater likelihood of legal 
action against the teacher. 
The physical educator must 
appreciate the nature of his responsibilities and maintain 
constant care to avoid injury to his students in the discharge 
of his teaching duties. 
The general law of negligence controls the decisions of 
teacher-student situations, and the reasonableness of the 
teacher's conduct will be deterahined by laymen and not his 
professional peers. The tests applied to legally determine 
the trained conclusions of the teacher's conduct may ignore 
what is professionally acceptable, therefore, constant 
consideration must be given to duties and responsibilities 
in light of individual circumstances. Each element of the 
physical education curriculum requires analysis of the 
pupils involved, giving attention to age, experience, and 
physical and mental capabilities. Subordinates of a program, 
including equipment and play area also prescribe the standards 
to apply to each teaching situation to avoid the possibility 
of injury to students. It is essential that every teacher 
understand the potential of his tort liability as established 
by the law in the jurisdiction in which he may teach. 
School districts in Iowa are afforded immunity from 
tort liability. This extension of the doctrine of "sovereign 
immunitytt inures only to the benefit of the school district 
itself, and, in effect, exposes the individual teacher to full 
and sole responsibility for his acts of negligence* 
67 
Physical education teachers cannot rely on the imnnmity 
of the school district to protect them or indemnify them for 
damages that may be assessed for negligent conduct even though 
the negligence may arise out of the discharge of their of- 
ficial duties. 
Several states have abolished the rule of immunity 
citing reascns ef social justice and the paramount right of 
the individual to be compensated for a wrong committed upon 
him. Other states provide insurance or have adopted "save 
harmless" statutes to protect teachers from claims arising 
out of negligence cemmitted within the scope of employment. 
Immunity from tart liability presently enjoyed by 
school districts in Iowa and by schosl districts in many 
other states is the subject sf constant attack. Abrogation 
mf the rule has been effected in several states either by 
judicial decision or statutory change. Although the Iowa 
Supreme Ceurt has refused to change the rule of imnunity, 
it is a reasonable assumption that legislative change may 
occur in the future. Abolishment of school district immunity 
would be of definite benefit t e  the individual physical 
education teacher. Until that time, each physical educator 
in Iowa must take cognizance of his individual responsibilities 
and exposure to personal liability for his negligent acts. 
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